At the end of Part 3, West Raynham had seen the war out and entered a new stage of life. With more upgrades and new aircraft arriving, its future looked secure. But not all would be well for those stationed here. The mid 50s, would see a tragedy that could have been so much worse.
The immediate post war period then saw fighter trials become the order of the day. The Royal Navy basing many of their types here for various trials and research projects. With two second line squadrons bringing their aircraft here No 746 Sqn and No 787 Sqn, the last piston engined examples to fly from West Raynham were the Fireflys and Hellcats of 746 Sqn RN, operating as part of the Naval Fighter Development Unit.
With the departure of the last aircraft, West Raynham was once again earmarked for upgrading which included amongst other things, another new watch office, designed to replace the mid-war example that had served so well. An additional extension to the perimeter track was also planned in, as was the creation of further, larger hardstands. In addition to all this, an increase in personnel was also envisaged and so extensions to the accommodation areas were also planned in once more. These upgrades were not subject to the same planning constraints as those originally built, and as such these buildings were not as ‘impressive’ as the older, original examples that remained on the site.
This particular watch office example (294/45), was a new and modern approach to airfield control buildings, incorporating for the first time an airfield control room (ACR later called Visual Control Room) the first of its kind. What made this building more significant than its predecessors was that it was designed with three floors as opposed to two, a style more commonly seen at wartime Naval stations.
The ground floor was primarily used as crew rest rooms (air and fire) with a kitchen, GPO equipment and a meteorological room. The first floor contained a planning room with a large plotting table and map wall, a feature reminiscent of World War II watch offices. A number of smaller rooms were also located off this room, providing accommodation for the Wing Commander and a Navigation Officer. The top floor was primarily the airfield control room (ACR) again a plotting table and additional staff rooms were located here. Also found here was the airfield lighting panel, R/T equipment and access to the ‘glasshouse’ above, with its distinguishable slanted windows. This floor gave a complete 3600 view around the entire airfield, a much improved view over pre and mid-war designs. The very design of this building has since been its saviour, as the best example of only one of five examples, its architectural interest, rarity, ‘completeness’ and interior systems, have enabled Historic England to list it as a Grade II building; this should at least offer it some protection from future development or demolition.
On completion of the work the airfield was passed to The Central Fighter Establishment (CFE) under the control of the RAF, where it began a new role as Britain’s top fighter training establishment, taking the airfield through the 1960s and on into the 1970s.
The CFE was a huge organisation formed in late 1944 through the amalgamation of a number of other training units: The Fighter Interception Unit, Air Fighting Development Unit, Fighter Combat School and the Fighter Leader School to name but a few. It would use personnel from across the military spectrum including: the RAF, Fleet Air Arm, Army Air Corps and the United States Air Force.
During this time, West Raynham operated as both a front line fighter base and as an aircrew training airfield. This would mean a huge influx of personnel and so a return to the high numbers of staff and aircraft that had been seen here during the war-time period.
In 1956, tragedy struck The Central Fighter Establishment here at West Raynham, when on 8th February, eight Hunter F1s took off from the airfield to carry out an exercise only to have six of them crash.
The exercise, a 4 against 4 dogfight involved two instructors and six students, and took place around 45,000ft in airspace above the airfield. By the time it had been completed, the weather over West Raynham had deteriorated so much that the eight aircraft had to be diverted to an alternative airfield, and RAF Marham was assigned. The cloud base was by now very low over West Raynham, as little as 250ft in places, and so a visual landing was almost impossible without GCA talk down (Ground Controlled Approach). Unfortunately, there was substantial R/T congestion that day and Marham GCA had great difficulty in picking up the Hunters. By now, the group had paired off and each pair had descended, flying low over West Raynham to pick up a heading for Marham’s runway (both runways were almost in direct line of each other), most of the aircraft were by now down to just minutes of fuel in their tanks.
By the time the aircraft were approaching Marham, the weather there had also deteriorated, and as such, the aircraft were unable to make a GCA landing. Of the eight, two managed to land one running out of fuel as it departed the runway, but the remaining six aircraft struggled, low on fuel and unable to see the ground, it became a near catastrophe.
Of those six, Hunter ‘WW639’ ‘N’ descended to 250 ft, after which the pilot lost visual contact with his leader. Now lacking sufficient fuel to land safely or divert elsewhere, the pilot elected to climb to 2,000 ft and eject. The Hunter, now pilot-less and without power, then crashed 3 miles south of Swaffham.
The second Hunter, ‘WW635’ ‘L’ was the only aircraft to have a fatality. The aircraft crashing four-and-a-half miles north-west of Swaffham killing the pilot Sqn. Ldr. R.J. Tumilty, (31).
The pilot of the next aircraft, Hunter ‘WW633’ ‘H’, descended to 500 ft, but with limited ground visibility also decided to climb away. Unfortunately he suffered an engine flame out and so ejected from the aircraft leaving it to crash in a field three-and-a-half miles north-west of Swaffham.
The fourth Hunter, ‘WW603’ ‘G’ attempted to land, but only managed a wheels up landing after also suffering a flame out. The aircraft came down not far from the eastern side of the airfield, the pilot escaping unhurt.
The fifth pilot, that of ‘WT639’ ‘N’, descended to 600 ft after being unable to contact Marham GCA. The cloud at this level was very dense, and also after losing his leader he too elected to climb away. As with other Hunters that day, he also suffered a flame out and so ejected at 2,500 ft leaving the aircraft to fall to Earth in a forest 2.5 miles south-west of Swaffham.
The final aircraft, ‘WT629’ ‘T’ suffered the same fate as many of the others. After running out of fuel, and unable to see the ground at 600 ft, the pilot elected to climb to 4,000 ft and eject. Now without either power or a pilot, the aircraft crashed in fields 2 miles northwest of Swaffham.
In a ministerial briefing after the Court of Enquiry had published their report, it was noted that the aircraft were not defective nor was there any question of inadequate fuel being supplied. The short range of early jets and these Hunters in particular being acknowledged by those present. The board highlighting that “the accidents were primarily caused by the sudden and unexpected deterioration in the weather“.
The board then questioned the basis of the divert to Marham, as it was based on the assumption that the weather was good at Marham.
“The question then arises whether, notwithstanding the deterioration that had taken place at West Raynham, the decision taken to divert the aircraft to Marham, spaced for visual landings, was correct. This diversion was ordered on the assumption that visual landings would be possible”.
The conclusion was that mistakes had been made and the report then went on to firmly lay the blame at the controller’s feet:
The findings of the enquiry concluded that this was an error on the part of the controllers at West Raynham, “who failed to appreciate that, because of the relative positions of the two airfields, it was probable that any deterioration in the weather at West Raynham would affect Marham shortly afterwards, thus necessitating Ground Control Approach landings there”.*5
As a result, controllers at West Raynham were subjected to disciplinary action over the incident, one of whom was removed from his post. It was a sad day indeed for the squadron and for all those who were involved at West Raynham. However, what turned out to be a loss of one life could have been so tragically worse.
The 1960s then saw even more changes at the airfield. As tensions across the world began to rise once more, so the country was put on alert. At West Raynham more new squadrons would arrive, the first, 85 Sqn, arrived at the airfield in September 1960, bringing more front line fighters to the site, this time it was Gloster’s distinguishable delta, the Javelin FAW 8.
Whilst at their previous base RAF West Malling, the squadron had been dogged with both starter problems and the serviceability of the A.I. radars on the Javelins; both of which continued after they arrived at West Raynham. At the end of the month senior officials from both the RAF and G.E.C. visited the base with a view to resolving the ongoing A.I. situation. However, the problems persisted even after they had gone, problems which merely compounded other issues the squadron were having around poorly fitted equipment, bad weather and surprisingly a lack of married quarters.
The Javelin was brought in to complement the Lightning, operating in the Night Fighter and all weather role, it was designed to intercept bombers that threatened the cities or airfields of Britain. In order to train aircrew in this role, a number of ‘support’ units were also established during this time. These included the Javelin Operational Conversion Squadron, a unit set up to convert pilots to the Javelin from other aircraft; the Fighter Support Development Squadron; the Fighter Command Instrument Training Squadron; the Radar Interception Development Squadron; the Night All Weather Wing and the Night Fighter Development Wing, along with numerous other units that supported the training of fighter pilots at this very busy airfield.
In July / August 1962, there were a spate of engine fires in Javelins at West Raynham, something that seemed to be a problem with these aircraft. Three such events affected XJ128, XA646 and XA701 during a three week period. There are no reports of injuries as a result of the incidents, and records simply show ‘engine fires at start up’. But it would appear to have been a rather regular occurrence at this time.
85 Squadron was then disbanded on March 31st 1963, a move that was forced by Duncan Sandy’s White Paper cutting back military expenditure on front line fighter units. They immediately reformed the next day taking over from the Target Facilities Squadron. They obtained new aircraft to fulfil the role, the Canberra T.11 – a B.2 converted to facilitate target towing, fighter interception and navigator training; all achieved through the fitting of a nose radome and A.I. radar. Their stay at West Raynham only lasted one more month though, when they finally left, transferring out to RAF Binbrook in Lincolnshire.
As Duncan Sandy’s White paper cut deep into the heart of the RAF, many of those connected with the Force were angered. In the last part of West Raynham, we see how one man took matters into his own hands only to suffer the severe consequences.